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ABSTRACT 
Protecting the public interest is at the core of federal securities 
laws. To protect the public interest is the mission of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and its raison d’être. At least, that is what the 
public is encouraged to believe. 
Protecting the public interest in Federal securities laws has been 
blindly accepted without questioning the basic assumption that the 
purpose of securities laws is to protect the public interest. However, a 
recent analysis of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“’34 Act”) 
has shown that protecting the public interest in the ’34 Act is a myth and 
that it is not the public interest, or even investors’ interests, that the ’34 
Act was primarily intended to protect, but the market interest.1
Contrary to popular belief, protecting investors’ interests is not 
the primary purpose of the securities laws, and protecting investors’ 
interests is merely derivative of the primary purpose—protecting the 
market interest—and protecting the public interest is non-existent.2 As 
1 Wm. Dennis Huber. Public Accounting and the Myth of the Public Interest. 16 
J. OF ACCT., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 251, 255-59 (2015).
2 Id.
1
Huber: The Myth of Protecting the Public Interest: The Case of the Missi
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
402 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 16
the Supreme Court has recently commented, “The magnitude of the 
federal interest in protecting the integrity and efficiency of the national 
securities market cannot be overstated.”3
Recognizing the true purpose of federal securities laws and the 
reasons for creating the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“Commission” or “SEC”) provides a greater understanding of the 
policy underlying the decisions (including rule-making and enforcement 
actions) of the SEC. It changes the nature of discourse concerning the 
best type of regulatory regime.
Key words: securities laws, public interest, market interest, investors’ 
interest, myth
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting the public interest is at the core of federal securities 
laws. To protect the public interest is the mission of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and its raison d’être. At least, that is what the 
public is encouraged to believe. 
Protecting the public interest in Federal securities laws has been 
blindly accepted without questioning the basic assumption that the 
purpose of securities laws is to protect the public interest. 
However, by dissecting and parsing the language of the statute, Wm. 
Dennis Huber concluded that protecting the public interest in the ’34 Act 
is a myth4 and that the reason for enacting the ’34 Act and creating the 
SEC was not to protect the public interest, and not primarily to protect 
investors’ interest, but to protect the “market interest.”5 Protecting 
investors’ interests were merely derivative of protecting the market 
interest, and protecting the public interest is non-existent.6 As the 
Supreme Court has recently commented, “[t]he magnitude of the federal 
interest in protecting the integrity and efficiency of the national securities 
market cannot be overstated.”7
This paper continues that analysis to determine whether 
protecting the public interest is the purpose of, or exists in, federal 
3 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 126 S. Ct. 
1503, 164 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2006).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
2
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securities laws. Recognizing the true purpose of federal securities laws 
and the reasons for creating the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“Commission” or “SEC”) provides a greater understanding of the policy 
underlying the decisions (including rule-making and enforcement 
actions) of the SEC. It changes the nature of discourse concerning the 
best type of regulatory regime.
The following section examines the public interest in federal 
securities laws. A discussion and conclusions follow. 
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
The securities laws examined here are the Securities Act of 1933 
(“’33 Act”) 8 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“’34 Act”).9 The 
federal securities laws have been amended many times since they were 
first enacted in 1933 and 1934, and Congress has incorporated into these 
laws other acts such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.10 The securities 
laws examined here are based on amendments to date.  
A. Securities Act of 1933 
The starting point of every case requiring the construction of a 
statute is the language of the statute itself.11 Therefore, an analysis of the 
missing mandate in federal securities laws begins with the language of 
the Securities Act of 1933.
The Securities Act of 1933 refers to the “public interest” not less 
than 29 times. “Protect” is used at least 31 times but none in relationship 
to protecting the public interest; only in relation to protecting investors’ 
interests. Unlike the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, discussed in 
section B, infra, the ’33 Act does not invoke the public interest as 
justification for enacting the Act. 
The ’33 Act requires issuers of securities to register and obtain 
approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to 
issuing securities to the public.12 Registration requires companies that 
8 15 U.S.C. 77a–77bbbb.
9 15 U.S.C. 78a–78pp.
10 15 U.S.C. 7201.
11 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, (1975) (Powell, 
J., concurring).
12 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2015).
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issue securities to the public to make financial disclosures under the 
federal securities laws and regulations,13 subject to certain exemptions.14
However, the requirement to register and obtain approval from 
the SEC is not intended to protect the public interest. According to the 
Supreme Court in A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp,15 “the 
essential purpose of the [1933 Act] is to protect investors…”16 Yet, as 
explained infra, the Supreme Court does not actually believe that the 
essential purpose of the ‘33 Act is to protect investors. 
The first time the “public interest” is mentioned is in reference to 
the definition of “prospectus” where it is stated that a communication is 
not prospectus if the communication contains, inter alia, “such other 
information as the Commission [Securities and Exchange Commission, 
“SEC”] by rules or regulations deemed necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest and for the protection of investors.”17
The next time the “public interest” is mentioned in the ’33 Act is 
in the mandate Congress issued to the SEC concerning its rulemaking 
process.18
Whenever the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking and is required to consider or 
determine whether an action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, the 
Commission shall also consider, in addition to
the protection of investors, whether the action 
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.19
13 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2012).
14 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012).
15 A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38 (1941).
16 Id. at 40.
17 15 U.S.C.A. 77b(a)(10) (West 2015) (emphasis added).
18 Courts consider securities laws to consist of mandates to the Commission. For 
example, the Second Circuit has stated that the SEC has “a mandate to consider 
competition with the protection of investors, efficiency, and capital formation.” 
Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005) rev'd sub 
nom; Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 449 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(stating, “The question in the present case [is] whether the Commission 
complied with its statutory mandate in promulgating Rule 3a12–3.”).
19 15 U.S.C.A. 77b(b) (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, “the SEC’s mandate [is] to consider competition 
with the protection of investors, efficiency, and capital formation;”20 i.e., 
the market and “market system.”21 As the Supreme Court has stated, 
“[t]he magnitude of the federal interest in protecting the integrity and 
efficiency of the national securities market cannot be overstated.”22
Note first that in this mandate the Commission is not always 
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, but whenever it is required to consider 
or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest, the Commission must also consider whether, in addition to the 
protection of investors, the action will promote efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation. 
Efficiency, competition, and capital formation is, of course, “the 
market system.”23 Not only is the Commission not required to engage in 
a cost/benefit analysis or weigh the costs and benefits if a particular 
action,24 regardless of what the costs may be or who may benefit, but it is 
not even required to balance the costs and benefits of the public interest 
with investors’ interest, and neither to be balanced with the market 
interest.
In Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald,25 the Ninth 
Circuit considered the context of “market efficiency” and Congressional 
intent. “Whatever the relationship of [NYSE Rule 347] to the objective 
of investor protection, it is germane to the goal of market efficiency.”26
The court went on to explain that the addition of the “national market 
system” language to section 2 by the 1975 Amendments to the ’33 Act 
supports the conclusion that “the 1975 Amendments [were] meant to 
clarify the scope of the Act, not to broaden it.”27
Second, although Congress had here an opportunity to address 
and incorporate, had it so desired, a mandate of protecting the public 
interest Congress explicitly ignored issuing a mandate to the 
20 Billing, 426 F.3d at 130.
21 15 U.S.C.A. 78b (West 2015).
22 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
23 15 U.S.C.A. 78b.
24 Donna M. Nagy. The costs of mandatory cost--benefit analysis in sec 
rulemaking. 57 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW 129, 2015.
25 Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005).
26 Id. at 1145 (Berzon, J., concurring) (citing Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 
358).
27 Id. at 1147.
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Commission to protect the public interest. Rather, the mandate here is 
only that whenever the Commission “is required to consider or determine 
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the 
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors…,” not that “the Commission shall also consider, in addition to 
protecting the public interest.” By purposely ignoring any reference to 
protecting the public interest, Congress narrowed the scope of the public 
interest from what would otherwise be understood to be the protection of 
the public to be the “protection of investors.”28
Third, Congress did not issue a mandate to the Commission that 
says
Whenever the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking and is required to consider or 
determine whether an action is necessary or 
appropriate for the protection of investors, the 
Commission shall also consider whether the 
action will, in addition, protect the public 
interest. 
Nor did Congress issue a mandate to the Commission 
that says
Whenever the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking and is required to consider or 
determine whether an action is necessary or 
appropriate for the protection of investors, and 
whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation, the
Commission shall also consider whether the 
action will, in addition, protect the public 
interest.  
Had Congress chosen language similar to either of the examples, 
the emphasis would not have been primarily on protecting the market 
interest and secondarily on protecting investors’ interest, but on 
28 When Congress choses certain wording it reveals Congressional intent. Word 
choice is critical to an understanding of the rule. Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, (2007), (Selya, Circuit Judge 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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protecting the public interest. As it is, protecting investors’ interest is 
only referenced insofar as protecting investors’ interest is germane to the 
goal of market efficiency and protecting the market, with no regard to 
protecting the public.29
Fourth, the Commission cannot, by law, consider whether an 
action is either necessary or appropriate in the public interest unless the 
action also protects investors and unless it also considers whether the 
action will “promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” 
Thus, if an action by the SEC could protect investors, the action could 
not be taken unless the SEC considers whether the action will promote 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
The language Congress chose vacillates between “necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of 
investors,”30 “the Commission may, by rule, prescribe for the protection 
of investors and in the public interest,”31 “the Commission may by rules 
or regulations require as being necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors,”32 and “necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of 
investors.”33
The plain language of a mandate such as “for the protection of 
investors and in the public interest” can only be interpreted as an action 
must be both “for the protection of investors” and “in the public 
interest.” An action cannot be one without the other.34 That is, an action 
by the Commission cannot be in the public interest unless it is also 
consistent with or for the protection of investors.35
The ordinary meaning of a mandate such as “shall by rules or 
regulations deemed necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors” necessarily means that an action by the 
Commission is either “in the public interest” or “for the protection of 
investors.” It is not required, or logically possible, that it be both “in the 
public interest” and “for the protection of investors,” let alone “for the 
29 Credit Suisse, 400 F.3d at1145 (Berzon, J., concurring).
30 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(2)(d)(iii) (2000).
31 15 U.S.C. § 77(d-1)(a)(12) (2000).
32 15 U.S.C. § 77(g)(a)(1) (2000).
33 15 U.S.C. § 77(z-3) (2000).
34 In set theory, this represents an intersection, AB, where only the elements 
common to both A and B are considered a set C and the rest are ignored.
35 Note, however, that “in the public interest” cannot be equated with 
“protecting the public interest.” 
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protection of the public interest” and “for the protection of investors.” 
That is, unlike an intersection, there are no elements common to both “in 
the public interest” or “for the protection of investors”36 so that, e.g., an 
action may protect investors’ interest but not be in the public interest. At 
the same time, the converse is not permitted. That is, it is not permitted 
that an action by the SEC protect the public interest if it does not protect 
investors’ interest.
It can be seen that the language throughout the ’33 Act (and also 
in the ’34 Act as discussed in section B, infra) admits to the presence of 
two factors—the public interest and the protection of investors’ interests. 
The public interest and the protection of investors’ interests are 
distinguished, and are often juxtaposed (i.e., necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors), but both are 
subjugated to protecting the market interest—i.e., the efficiency of the 
market system, competition within the market, and capital formation in 
the market.
There are competing views of the public interest,37 the resolution 
of which is political, not judicial.38 However, neither the statutes (the 
political resolution), nor the courts (the judicial resolution) recognize any 
public interest, no matter how defined or by whom, other than the 
“investing public” thereby rendering other definitions or competing 
views of the public interest superfluous. 
The SEC is charged with the duty of enforcing the ‘33 Act “in 
the public interest.”39 One such authorization to enforce its rules is that 
whenever the Commission determines that a violation specified in a 
notice instituting proceedings has occurred, may occur, or may continue 
to occur and is 
likely to result in…significant harm to investors, 
or substantial harm to the public interest, 
including, but not limited to, losses to the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation…the 
Commission may enter a temporary order 
requiring the respondent to cease and 
desist…and to take such action to 
36 In set theory, this is called the empty set.
37 SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012).
38 Id.
39 United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007).
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prevent…significant harm to investors, or 
substantial harm to the public interest.40
At first glance this appears to indicate an intent to protect the 
public interest. However, on closer examination that is shown not to be 
the case. While “significant harm” and “substantial harm” may be 
considered a matter of degree, there is nothing in the language to suggest 
that any past, present or future violation of any securities statute or 
Commission rule could harm anyone other than investors. Protecting the 
public interest and preventing harm to the public interest might be the 
case if the Securities Investor Protection Corporation [SIPC] were 
funded by taxpayers, but it is funded by broker dealers. Thus, once again, 
the public interest is not the public, but the investing public.
When the Commission initiates an action to enforce the 
securities laws, “it vindicates public rights and furthers the public 
interest.” 41 The purpose of an enforcement action by the Commission “is 
to expeditiously safeguard the public interest by enjoining securities 
violations.”42 But, did the court really mean “safeguard the public 
interest?”
No. It is clear that by “safeguard the public interest” the court 
did not mean safeguard the “public interest” as the court went on to 
clarify and narrow the meaning of “safeguard the public interest”—
enforcement actions further the Commission’s mission of “protecting 
investors and safeguarding the integrity of the markets.”43 Thus, 
vindicating public rights and furthering the public interest is for the
primary purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the markets and the 
secondary purpose of protecting investors, not the public interest. 
Protecting investors is only for the greater purpose of safeguarding the 
40 15 U.S.C. § 78u–3(c) (2002).
41 S.E.C. v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993). See also SEC v. Calvo, 378 
F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir.2004), S.E.C. v. City of Miami, 581 F. App'x 757 
(11th Cir. 2014), and SEC v. Diversified Corporate Consulting Group, 378 F.3d 
1219, 1224 (11th Cir.2004). “Public rights” is peculiar and undefined. If the 
public had rights under the securities laws then the public would have standing 
to sue for violation of those rights.
42 Id.
43 S.E.C. v. Rind, supra n. 41; In re Sherman, 441 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2006) 
opinion amended and superseded, 491 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2007). Emphasis 
added.
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integrity of the market—efficiency, competition, and capital formation,44
and only if the protection of investors is germane to the goal of market 
efficiency.45
Steve Thel has commented, 
The theme that ties the Act together is a concern with 
security prices. The Act provides for extensive control 
over several critical factors affecting prices, including 
production and dissemination of information that might 
affect prices, the flow of money into and out of the 
market, and the basic structure of the securities 
market…the fundamental purpose of the Act [is] to 
protect the public's interest in the integrity of security 
prices.46
Yet, only the investing public has an interest in the integrity of security 
prices.
A more troubling aspect of the absence of protecting public 
interest found in the ’33 Act, and one which confirms the non-existence 
of protecting the public interest as the mission and mandate of the SEC, 
concerns the development of generally accepted accounting principles 
(“GAAP”) for financial statement reporting. Congress has vested the 
SEC with the sole authority to 
prescribe the form or forms in which required 
information shall be set forth, the items or 
details to be shown in the balance sheet and 
earning statement, and the methods to be 
44 Jeana Bisnar, 100% capitalist, 90% of the time: the 20 day short-sale ban, 66 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 299; What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://perma.cc/UD6B-CKFY (last updated June 10, 2013) (“The mission of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation”).
45 Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Berzon, J., concurring) (citing Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 358).
46 Steve Thel. The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act. 42 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 385, 391. “The magnitude of the 
federal interest in protecting the integrity and efficiency of the national 
securities market cannot be overstated.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 126 
S. Ct. 1503, 164 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2006).
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followed in the preparation of accounts, in the 
appraisal or valuation of assets and liabilities, in 
the determination of depreciation and depletion, 
in the differentiation of recurring and non-
recurring in-come, in the differentiation of 
investment and operating income, and in the 
preparation, where the Commission deems it 
necessary or desirable, of consolidated balance 
sheets or income accounts of any person directly 
or indirectly controlling or controlled by the 
issuer, or any person under direct or indirect 
common control with the issuer.47
Since its creation in 1934 the SEC has “‘outsourced’ its statutory 
authority to promulgate financial accounting rules applicable to 
companies that must make financial disclosures under the federal 
securities laws.”48 From 1933 to 1973 the SEC, by default, delegated to 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) 
through its various committees49 the responsibility for developing and 
adopting GAAP,50 a move that was heavily criticized by Robert Chatov51
among others, as an abandonment by the SEC of its statutory directive to 
proscribe accounting standards. Financial reporting standard-setting was 
first institutionalized with the enactment of the ’33 Act and ’34 Act that 
directed the SEC to determine the form and content of financial 
statements required by companies issuing securities to the public.52 Soon 
thereafter the SEC delegated the responsibility of developing accounting 
47 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2002).
48 Jacob L. Barney, Beyond Economics: The U.S. Recognition of International 
Financial Reporting Standards as an International Subdelegation of the SEC's 
Rulemaking Authority, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 579 (2009). “Congress 
first granted explicit statutory authorization of the SEC's sub-delegation of 
accounting rulemaking authority in 2002, despite the fact that the SEC had sub-
delegated this authority since 1938.”
49 Omar Ochoa, Accounting for FASB: Why Administrative Law Should Apply to 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board. 15 TEXAS REVIEW OF LAW &
POLITICS 489, 2011.
50 Id.
51 Robert Chatov, The Collapse of Corporate Financial standards Regulation: A 
Study of SEC-Accountant Interaction (1973) (dissertation) (on file with 
University of California, Berkeley); Jacob L. Barney, supra n. 48.
52 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2010).
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reporting standards to the AICPA, then known as American Institute of 
Accountants (AIA).53
As the implied agent of the SEC,54 one would think that the 
AICPA would be concerned with the public interest, at least with the 
same public interest, i.e., the investing public, as the SEC is concerned 
with. But that is far from the truth. 
According to the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct
members of the AICPA are required to “serve the public interest when 
providing financial services.”55 The Code strongly encourages members 
to “accept the obligation to act in a way that will serve the public 
interest, honor the public trust, and demonstrate a commitment to 
professionalism.”56 But, as observed by Wm. Dennis Huber, the public 
interest of the AICPA, the delegatee of the SEC from 1934 to 1973, 
consists of every interest but the public’s.57
The accounting profession’s public consists of 
clients, credit grantors, governments, employers, 
investors, the business and financial community, 
and others who rely on the objectivity and 
integrity of members to maintain the orderly 
functioning of commerce.58
While it is doubtful that anyone relies on the AICPA to 
maintain the orderly functioning of commerce,59 to underscore 
its narrow conception of the public interest the AICPA 
subsequently defines the public interest as “the collective well-
being of the community of people and institutions that the 
53 Omar Ochoa, supra n. 49
54 Lawrence A. Cunningham. The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic 
Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2008). “U.S. securities laws 
vest the SEC with authority to define GAAP. The SEC traditionally discharges 
this responsibility by delegation. Pursuant to this authority, in 1973, the SEC 
formally recognized FASB pronouncements as authoritative. This ordained a 
delegation model that raised agency-principal issues.”
55 Code of Professional Conduct. New York: American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. 1992. The Code applies only to members. Membership is 
voluntary. (N/C).
56 Id.
57 Huber, supra note 1, at 262.
58 Code of Professional Conduct, supra n. 61.
59 Huber, supra note 1, at 263.
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profession serves”60 (which not only puts clients, i.e. the 
corporations it audits, at the top of the list but also emphasizes 
the place of clients as first), financial institutions and other credit 
grantors second, investors fourth, and not even an 
acknowledgement of the public interest. The AICPA thus not 
only excludes from the public interest persons outside those 
whom the profession serves and who do not rely on the 
objectivity and integrity of its members to maintain the orderly 
functioning of commerce, but includes the collective well-being 
of the corporations it audits, along with financial and credit 
granting institutions. 
With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),
however, Congress explicitly authorized the SEC to delegate its authority 
to develop GAAP to private entities.61
RECOGNITION OF ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out its authority 
under sub-section (a) and under section 13(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the 
Commission may recognize, as ‘‘generally 
accepted’’ for purposes of the securities laws, 
any accounting principles established by a 
standard setting body—
(A) that—
(i) is organized as a private entity; 
(ii) has, for administrative and 
operational purposes, a board of trustees 
(or equivalent body) serving in the 
public interest...62
60 Id. The International Federation of Accountants (“IFAC”) defines the public 
interest more broadly. According to IFAC, the public interest is “The net 
benefits derived for, and procedural rigor employed on behalf of, all society in 
relation to any action, decision or policy” Int’l Fed’n Acct., A Definition of the 
Public Interest, IFAC POLICY POSITION 5 (June 2015), https://perma.cc/SYT5-
67P9.
61 15 U.S.C.A. 77s(b)(1) (West 2015).
62 Id.
13
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There is only one private entity that the SEC currently 
recognizes—the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”).63 The 
FASB was formed in 1973 as an independent, private sector organization 
to replace the AICPA as the agent of the SEC for establishing standards 
of financial reporting that govern the preparation of financial statements 
issued by non-governmental entities.64 Although the SEC retains its 
standard-setting authority and can overrule the FASB it has rarely done 
so.65
Prior to SOX, the FASB’s role as financial reporting standard-
setter was similar to that of the AICPA in being unofficially recognized
by the SEC.66 However, SOX explicitly authorized the SEC to formalize 
the recognition of a private financial reporting standard-setting body if 
the body met certain conditions, one of which is that the organization 
“has, for administrative and operational purposes, a board of trustees (or 
equivalent body) serving in the public interest.”67
While the private entity that the SEC presently recognizes is the 
FASB, there has been much debate recently by both lawyers and legal 
researchers,68 and public accountants and accounting researchers,69 as
63 Jacob L. Barney, supra n. 53; Lawrence A. Cunningham, supra n. 60; FASB. 
2015, https://perma.cc/7M6M-73BE.
64 Facts about FASB, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD, https://perma.cc/CY4A-8NJF 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
65 William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 47 B.C. L. REV. 5 (2007).
66 Omar Ochoa, Accounting for FASB: Why Administrative Law Should Apply to 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board. 15 TEXAS REVIEW OF LAW &
POLITICS 489, 2011.
67 Id.
68 Jacob L. Barney, supra n. 53. The SEC currently recognizes the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the organization empowered to 
promulgate such accounting rules. Recently, however, the SEC has considered 
allowing companies, both foreign and U.S.-based, to disclose financial 
information in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) promulgated by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of "Principles-
Based Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting, 60 
Vand. L. Rev. 1411, 1473-74 (2007). See David Alexander and Eva 
Jermakowicz, A True and Fair View of the Principles/Rules Debate, 42 
ABACUS 132, 161 (2006).
69 See, e.g, Philip P. M. Joos & Edith Leung, Investor Perceptions of Potential 
IFRS Adoption in the United States. 88 ACCT. REV. 2, 577-609, 2013.
14
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss2/3
Spring] The Missing Mandate 415
well as within the SEC itself, 70 concerning the possibility of adoption by 
the SEC of International Financial Accounting Standards (“IFRS”) which 
are set by the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”),71 an 
international financial accounting standard-setting body established in 
2001.72
IFRS proclaims its mission is “to develop International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) that bring transparency, accountability and 
efficiency to financial markets around the world. Our work serves the 
public interest by fostering trust, growth and long-term financial stability 
in the global economy.”73 The IASB further claims that it is “committed 
to developing, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, global 
accounting standards that provide high quality, transparent and 
comparable information in general purpose financial statements.”74 But 
assuming the IASB actually achieves that goal the IASB makes no claim 
that the global accounting standards it develops would in fact protect 
either the public interest or even investors’ interest. 
The IASB contends that it serves (which is not the same as 
“protects”) the public interest by “fostering trust, growth and long-term 
financial stability in the global economy” by bringing transparency to 
financial markets; by bringing accountability to financial markets; and 
by brining efficiency to financial markets. Thus, like the federal 
securities laws, the market interest is given pre-eminence over the public 
interest such that any “action, decision or policy” made by IASB will, 
consistent with the SEC’s mission, “promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation”75 in the “transactions in securities,”76 i.e., the market.
70 Jacob L. Barney, supra n. 53. In October 2002, FASB and IASB jointly
released a memorandum of understanding known as the “Norwalk Agreement,” 
which "marked a significant step toward formalizing their commitment to the 
convergence of U.S. and international accounting standards."
71 Lawrence A. Cunningham. supra note 68, at 1486-87.
72 IFRS FOUNDATIONS, https://perma.cc/TG7Y-P9Z8. (The IASB was created in 
1973 and originally called the International Accounting Standards Committee).
73 IFRS FOUNDATIONS, https://perma.cc/4L7M-S6RS, (2015) (About the IFRS 
Foundation and the IASB), emphasis added.
74 IFRS Foundation, supra, n. 72 emphasis added.
75 15 U.S.C. § 77(b).
76 15 U.S.C. § 78(b).
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B. Securities and Exchange Act of 193477
The public interest is referred to at least 189 times in the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (’34 Act),78 the most important of 
which is found in the purpose for creating the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. “Protect” is used only 23 times, but none in the context of 
protecting the public interest. It is always used in the context of 
protecting investors. However, contrary to several court rulings,79 even 
protecting investor was not the primary reason for enacting the ’34 Act 
and creating the SEC. 
Protecting investors is merely derivative to the primary purpose 
for which Congress created the SEC, and protecting the public interest is 
not even acknowledged. “The magnitude of the federal interest in 
protecting the integrity and efficiency of the national securities market 
cannot be overstated.”80
§78b. Necessity for regulation 
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, 
transactions in securities as commonly 
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-
the-counter markets are effected with a national
public interest which makes it necessary to 
provide for regulation and control of such 
transactions and of practices and matters related 
thereto, including transactions by officers, 
directors, and principal security holders, to 
require appropriate reports, to remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a 
national market system for securities and a 
national system for the clearance and settlement 
of securities transactions and the safeguarding of 
securities and funds related thereto, and to 
77 Much of this section is adapted from Huber, supra note 1, with permission.
78 15 U.S.C. § 78(b).
79 For example, “The purpose of the 1934 Act was to benefit and protect 
investors…,” United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007); A.C. Frost 
& Co, 312 U.S. at 38., “Nevertheless, as with the 1934 Act, Congress was 
primarily concerned with protecting the investing public when it passed the 
1933 Act.”  
80 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
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impose requirements necessary to make such 
regulation and control reasonably complete and 
effective, in order to protect interstate 
commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing 
power, to protect and make more effective the 
national banking system and Federal Reserve 
System, and to insure the maintenance of fair 
and honest markets in such transactions…81
Transactions in securities conducted on securities exchanges and 
over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest 
which is explicitly declared to be the market: the “national market system
for securities” and “fair and honest markets.” It is the transactions in 
securities (i.e., the purchase and sale of securities) conducted upon
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets that are effected with 
a national public interest. It is the national public interest in the
transactions that makes it necessary to provide for regulation of the 
market in order to (1) remove impediments to and perfect the 
mechanisms of a national market system for securities; and (2) perfect 
the mechanisms of a national market system for securities. The national 
public interest in the transactions makes it necessary to provide for 
regulation of the market to “impose requirements necessary to make such 
regulation and control reasonably complete and effective.” 
Why does the national public interest in transactions in securities 
make it necessary to impose requirements to make regulation and control 
of transactions in securities as conducted upon securities exchanges and 
over-the-counter markets reasonably complete and effective? Three 
reasons are given, two directly related to protection and one indirectly 
related to protection. The first is in order to protect not the public 
interest, or even investors, but to protect interstate commerce, to protect 
the national credit, and to protect the Federal taxing power. The second
is, again, not to protect the public interest or investors, but to protect and 
make more effective the national banking system and to protect the 
Federal Reserve System. The third is indirectly related to protecting the 
market—“to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in 
transactions in securities conducted upon securities exchanges and over-
the-counter markets.”
81 15 U.S.C. § 78(b).
17
Huber: The Myth of Protecting the Public Interest: The Case of the Missi
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
418 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 16
That Congress omitted protection of the public interest or 
investors’ interest in providing for regulation of the market by the SEC is 
glaringly obvious and it must be concluded that excluding protection of 
the public interest was intentional.82
Clearly the regulation and control of transactions in securities 
protects the interest of the participants in the market, i.e., investors, the 
buyers and sellers of securities. But the protection of the interest of 
buyers and sellers of securities is derivative of the reasons given by 
Congress for regulating and controlling the market in transactions in 
securities: to protect interstate commerce, to protect the national credit, 
to protect the Federal taxing power, and to protect and make more 
effective the national banking system and the Federal Reserve System. 
As the Ninth Circuit explain in SEC v. Rind,83 actions to deter violations 
of the securities laws furthers the SEC’s mission of “protecting investors 
and safeguarding the integrity of the markets.”84
As with the ’33 Act, the language of the ’34 Act alternates 
between “the public interest and the protection of investors,”85 “the 
public interest or the protection of investors,”86 “consistent with the 
public interest and the protection of investors,”87 “having due regard for 
the public interest, the protection of investors, and the maintenance of 
fair and orderly markets, to use its authority under this title to facilitate 
the establishment of a national market system for securities,”88 and 
“consistent with the public interest, the protection of investors, and the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets.”89
But in case the ultimate purpose of enacting the securities laws 
and creating the SEC was not understood to be the protection of the 
82 When Congress choses certain wording it reveals Congressional intent. Word 
choice is critical to an understanding of the rule. Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 573 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2010), (Selya, 
Circuit Judge concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83 SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir.1993).
84 Id. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 
126 S. Ct. 1503, 164 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2006). “The magnitude of the federal 
interest in protecting the integrity and efficiency of the national securities 
market cannot be overstated.”
85 15 U.S.C. § 78o.
86 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1.
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market, Congress subsequently repeated how the public interest is to be 
considered by the SEC. The language mirrors that of the ’33 Act.90
CONSIDERATION OF PROMOTION OF 
EFFICIENCY, COMPETITION, AND 
CAPITAL FORMATION.—Whenever pursuant 
to this title the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking, or in the review of a rule of a self-
regulatory organization, and is required to 
consider or determine whether an action is 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
the Commission shall also consider, in addition 
to the protection of investors, whether the action 
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.91
The public interest cannot, by law, be considered without 
considering the market interest. The unavoidable implication is that if a 
rule would protect the public interest, but such rule would not promote 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, i.e., the market and 
market system, then the rule could not be adopted. 
Still not satisfied, Congress once more repeated the mandate for 
how and when the public interest is to be considered: 
CONSIDERATIONS. — In developing any
rules under paragraph (1), the Commission shall
consider whether the rules will promote investor 
protection, efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.92
Here, although the protecting the public interest is again ignored, 
investor protection is recognized, but only insofar as investor protection 
promotes efficient and competitive capital formation. Capital formation 
is, of course, the transactions in securities in a national market system. 
90 15 U.S.C. § 77(b).
91 15 U.S.C. § 78f, emphasis added.
92 15 U.S.C. § 78o, emphasis added.
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That is, in developing rules, the rules must be “germane to the goal of 
market efficiency.”93
How is the Commission to implement the policies and purposes 
of the Securities laws? One way is by holding annual conferences. 
In order to carry out these policies and purposes, 
the Commission shall conduct an annual 
conference as well as such other meetings as are 
deemed necessary, to which representatives 
from such securities associations, securities self-
regulatory organizations, agencies, and private 
organizations involved in capital formation shall
be invited to participate.94
The public is not invited as a representative. Only those involved 
in capital formation, involved in the market system, shall be invited to 
participate. The public, as in “public interest,” is not among those who 
shall be invited to participate. 
What is called the “public interest” is actually the “market 
interest.” It is not that the public interest is synonymous with the market 
interest but that the use of the term public interest deflects the public’s 
attention away from understanding that the purpose of the securities laws 
and the purpose of creating the SEC is to protect the market interest 
rather than the public interest. “The dominant congressional purposes
underlying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were to promote free 
and open public securities markets and to protect the investing 
public…”95
Even in those instance where courts have acknowledged a 
protection of the “public interest,” the public in public interest is not the 
public, but the investing public—“The SEC’s statutory task is to protect 
the investing public by policing the securities markets and preventing 
fraud.”96 “Congress passed the anti-falsity provisions of the 1933 and 
93 Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Berzon, J., concurring) (citing Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 358).
94 15 U.S.C. § 77s(d)(4), emphasis added.
95 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 
1968).
96 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (2007).
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1934 Acts to protect the United States securities markets and the 
investing public against securities frauds and deceptions.”97
For the almost 200 references to the public interest in the ’34 
Act, none are accompanied with an explanation of how any rule or action 
taken by the SEC protects the public interest with one exception. But that 
one exception applies to government securities brokers and dealers and is 
based on the type of security, not the mission and mandate of the 
Commission. Furthermore, that one narrow exception to the missing 
mandate to protect the public interest in the securities laws demonstrates 
that had Congress wanted to issue a mandate to the SEC to protect the 
public interest it knew how to do so. The exception is the market for 
government securities. 
Rules promulgated and orders issued under this 
section shall—(A) be designed to prevent 
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices 
and to protect the integrity, liquidity, and 
efficiency of the market for government 
securities, investors, and the public interest. 98
That Congress carved out an exception for protecting the public 
interest for the market for government securities, even if it is after the 
market interest and investors’ interest, is easily understood due to the 
nature of government securities. Unlike non-government (corporate) 
securities, government securities are inherently related to and inseparable 
from the public, not just investors. That is, in addition to investors (the 
buyers and sellers of government securities), governments issuing 
securities involve those who are not investors, who are not part of the 
market, the market system, or transactions in securities—citizens, 
taxpayers, and voters, i.e., the public. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) amended the 
Securities Laws to, among other things, create the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”). The PCAOB is a private 
corporation, but its oversight lies with the SEC.99
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF BOARD.—There is 
established the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, to oversee the audit of 
97 In re Kingate Mgmt. Ltd. Litig., 784 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2015).
98 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5.
9915 U.S.C. § 7211.
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public companies that are subject to the 
securities laws, and related matters, in order 
to protect the interests of investors and 
further the public interest in the preparation 
of informative, accurate, and independent 
audit reports for companies the securities of 
which are sold to, and held by and for, 
public investors. The Board shall be a body 
corporate, operate as a nonprofit 
corporation, and have succession until 
dissolved by an Act of Congress.100
The “public interest” is referred to in SOX not less than 28 
times, but none in connection with protecting the public interest.
As noted by Huber, “To protect investors” is explicit and easily 
understood. Investors are (assumed to be) protected by informative, 
accurate and independent audit reports. However, “And the public 
interest” is less easily understood since the public does not use audit 
reports no matter how informative, accurate, or independent they may 
be.101 But by synthesizing the Congressional findings for creating the 
SEC, with the purpose of creating the PCAOB it can safely be concluded 
that the role of the PCAOB in overseeing audits of public companies is 
to produce informative, accurate and independent audit reports in order 
to protect the market by (1) removing impediments to the mechanisms; 
(2) perfecting the mechanisms of the market; (3) insuring the 
maintenance of fair and honest markets; and (4) maintaining the orderly 
functioning of the market.102
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to expose as a myth the 
assumption that protecting the public interest exists within the federals 
securities laws by conducting an exegetical analysis of the statutes. By 
parsing and dissecting the language of the federal securities laws, the 
assumption that protecting the public interest exists in federal securities 
laws is shown to be a myth. The missing mandate in the federal securities 
100 Id.
101 Huber. supra note 1, at 262.
102 Id.
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laws is a mandate to protect the public interest. That omission must be 
considered to be deliberate, as well as the intent to mislabel the 
protection of the market interest and investors’ interest as the public 
interest.
While both the market and investors’ interests are important and 
need to be protected, it should not be done under the guise of protecting 
the public interest when protecting the public interest is clearly not the 
purpose or intent of the federal securities laws or the mission of the SEC.
By disguising the market interest with the cloak of the public interest
language, an illusion has been created that has transformed the discourse 
from protecting the market interest into protecting (a non-existent) public 
interest. The cloak of public interest confers upon the market interest a 
legitimacy to which it is not entitled.103
Recognizing that there is no protection of the public interest in 
federal securities laws will allow a more meaningful discourse on the 
best type regulatory regime. Recognizing that there is no mandate to 
protect the public interest can refocus the debate as to the extent of rules 
and enforcement actions by the SEC, and perhaps amendments to the 
securities laws.
103 Id. at 271.
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